Hedge-fund managers justify share restrictions as a means of protecting the common interest of the shareholders. However, this paper demonstrates that such restrictions can adversely induce information asymmetry between managers and their clients about future fund ‡ows. Focusing on share-restricted funds, this paper demonstrates that funds with recent out ‡ows underperform funds with recent in ‡ows by about 5.6% annually over 1998-2008. No such return spread is observed for funds with low-share restriction. The e¤ect is mainly driven by the underperformance of funds with recent out ‡ows. As managers may also act as investors in their own funds, the information asymmetry potentially allows them to trade in advance of their clients to avoid such losses. Consistent with this hypothesis, the ‡ow return spread is more pronounced in funds managing insider wealth, as well as in funds with low levels of corporate governance. Even a conservative estimate of the potential pro…ts from engaging in such activity amount to about $215 million per year collectively over the sample period. These results therefore highlight the signi…cance of the recent SEC allegations of ‡ow-front-running activity by hedgefund insiders.
Introduction
In recent years, several case …lings of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) have highlighted the signi…cance of inside information about the investor ‡ow of hedge funds. These cases mainly present evidence that managers redeem their own capital from their funds in anticipation of future losses or future redemption requests, without alerting other investors. 1 In some cases, managers exercise preferential discretion, allowing some investors to redeem funds prior to other investors. 2 The frequency of this ‡ow front-running phenomenon is yet unclear, as is its economic magnitude, as measured by the potential losses for ‡ow-uninformed investors. In addition, there is the possibility of a similar e¤ect for fund in ‡ow, that is, allowing some investors to enter a fund prior to other investors. Civil Action No. 10-10073) and SEC vs. two hedge-fund managers at Bear Stearns (Civil Action No. 08-2457) . 2 An example of such a case is SEC vs. State Street Bank and Trust (Civil Action No. 10172) . In addition, the Wall Street Journal reported on November 13, 2010 , that the SEC is investigating whether Harbinger Capital Partners gave illegal preferential treatment to its founder and to some clients. 3 A recent example in the spirit of front-running investor in ‡ow, is the one reported by Wall Street Journal on March 31, 2011. The article reported that a senior executive at Berkshire Hathaway had bought shares of a …rm that was shortly after acquired by Berkshire Hathaway. The case is still under review by the SEC, however, an internal review by Berkshire's audit committee released end of April 2011 concluded that the executive violated insider-trading rules.
is used by ‡ow-informed investors to redeem their shares prior to less informed outsider-investors.
The SEC has recently …led several similar cases which indicate that the cases of front-running fund ‡ow by ‡ow-informed investors may not be isolated. This paper outlines the mechanism by which a wealth can be transferred from ‡ow-uninformed to ‡ow-informed investors, and highlights the type of funds and circumstances for which such a phenomenon might occur.
One key input to this discussion is the institutionalization of share restrictions in the hedgefund industry. These restrictions, such as lockup periods or redemption-notice periods, serve the interests of both fund managers and their investors. Given the compensation structure applied in this industry, these restrictions satisfy managers'incentive to keep assets in the funds for as long as possible. In addition, these restrictions allow fund managers to slowly acquire or sell positions in illiquid assets, while reducing the impact of price pressures induced by their trades (see Aragon (2007)). This is especially important for fund investors when other investors wish to redeem their shares quickly; the share restrictions allow managers to slowly unwind positions instead of engaging in …re sales, thereby protecting the value of the assets for the remaining investors. Therefore, the practice of share restrictions seems like a reasonable equilibrium outcome.
On the other hand, share restrictions can also adversely a¤ect outside investors by inducing information asymmetry between managers and their clients about future fund ‡ows. For example, upon a decision to redeem shares, an investor would submit a redemption request to the fund manager. The manager then has pre-speci…ed period of time (the redemption-notice period) to return the capital to the investor. The implication of this arrangement from an econometric perspective is that when the ‡ow is observed in the dataset, and is also then observed by the remaining investors, it has already been known to the fund manager. It follows that although the stated goal of instituting share restrictions may be to allow the managers su¢ cient time to search for liquidity, these restrictions also induce information asymmetry between fund managers and their clients.
In and of itself, the information asymmetry between managers and investors about future ‡ow is not problematic, unless managers also act as investors in their own funds (or they release the information to other privileged investors). In fact, it is common practice for managers to invest in their own funds, and they are even encouraged to do so by investors as means of aligning incentives.
Yet, if fund ‡ow predicts fund performance, the information asymmetry induced by share restriction would potentially allow fund managers to trade in advance of their clients to capture future gains or avoid future losses. Even if managers do not act, conveying ‡ow information to some clients in advance of others can potentially create a similar wealth transfer between ‡ow-informed and ‡ow-uninformed investors.
We begin the analysis by examining the smart-money e¤ect in the universe of hedge funds.
This e¤ect, which has been extensively documented in the mutual-fund literature (see, e.g., Gruber (1996) and Zheng (1999)), alludes to the fact that funds with recent in ‡ows typically outperform funds with recent out ‡ows. Focusing on share-restricted hedge funds, this paper demonstrates that funds with recent in ‡ows outperform funds with recent out ‡ows by about 5.6% annually over 1999-2008, while no such return spread is observed for funds with low-share restriction. Separating in ‡ows and out ‡ows, we …nd that both predict one-month-ahead performance relative to the hedgefund index, but long-run performance reveals that in ‡ows induce a transitory e¤ect on performance while the out ‡ow e¤ect is mostly permanent. We also …nd that the ‡ow return spread is mostly apparent in share-restricted funds that invest in illiquid securities, as proxied by the measure of Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004) . To reduce the impact of incubation bias, we discard the …rst three years of reported performance for each fund throughout the analyses in the paper.
Share restrictions sever the ability to pro…t from inside information about fund ‡ow. Managers of such funds have access to information about investor ‡ow prior to the remaining investors, and may submit their own subscription or redemption requests upon learning this information, or share it with some, but not all, investors. Consistently, we …nd that the ‡ow return spread is more pronounced for funds in which manager wealth is invested. Furthermore, we devise a measure of fund governance, and show that the ‡ow return spread is more pronounced in funds with low levels of investor protection. Although the paper cannot provide direct evidence of managers acting on inside information, it points to some situations for which insider trading may occur. Furthermore, we consevatively estimate that the potential pro…ts from engaging in such activity amount to about $215 million per year over the sample period. These results therefore provide a quanti…cation for the recent SEC allegations of ‡ow-front-running activity by hedge-fund insiders.
This paper is related to two recent strands of literature. The …rst is the literature on fund ‡ows. Ding, Getmansky, Liang, and Wermers (2009) show that the ‡ow-chasing phenomenon in mutual funds (e.g., Ippolito (1992) , Chevalier and Ellison (1997), and Sirri and Tufano (1998) ) is also strongly apparent in hedge funds, but only among those with low share restriction. Teo (2010) further documents that such funds may also be signi…cantly exposed to liquidity risk, highlighting the imbalance between the liquidity a fund o¤ers to its investors and the liquidity of its positions.
In contrast to these studies, our results mostly pertain to restricted funds, showing that the smartmoney e¤ect is signi…cantly apparent in these funds, but not in the unrestricted funds. We also study the liquidity risk exposure of restricted out ‡ow funds, and …nd them positively exposed to liquidity risk, suggesting that the ‡ow-front running opportunities are pro…table primarily during illiquid periods. Finally, in contrast to Frazzini and Lamont (2008) , who …nd a long-run dumbmoney e¤ect in mutual funds, we show that the out ‡ows from restricted hedge funds impose a permanent long-run e¤ect on performance. This permanent e¤ect can arise if a fund's portfolio is di¤erent pre-and post- ‡ow. For example, a disproportionate sale of assets by a fund will translate into a permanent e¤ect on fund value because the price reversal following the initial price pressure may be experienced by assets that are no longer held by the fund. Leverage can also induce permanent e¤ects: if a fund is required to de-leverage as part of its response to out ‡ows, the fund will not experience a full return reversal. Since hedge funds have the ability to undertake more ‡exible investment decisions than mutual funds, the e¤ects of fund ‡ow on investor share value seem more important in hedge funds than in mutual funds.
The second related literature concerns corporate governance. La Porta, López-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (2002) show that …rms in countries with better investor protection have higher valuations. Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) propose a corporate governance index per …rm and
show that stock returns of high-corporate-governance …rms are higher than those with low corporate governance. In this paper, we develop a measure of governance for hedge funds and similarly
show that high-governance hedge funds outperform low-governance funds. Furthermore, we …nd that the ‡ow return spread is higher among low governance funds, suggesting that funds that o¤er their investors lower protection are also those for which the potential front-running is more profitable. Our measure of governance is also related to recent literature about fund operational risk.
For example, relying on SEC …lings, Brown, Goetzmann, Liang, and Schwartz (2008) Another consideration is that in light of the recent …nancial crisis, managers are further pressured to invest their own wealth in their funds, to better align manager-client incentives. However, as stressed throughout the paper, the presence of share restrictions may provide an informational advantage to the managers. The implication is that funds with a signi…cant amount of manager wealth should be required to reduce their share restrictions. Finally, for funds that invest primarily in illiquid securities, instead of reducing share restrictions altogether, thereby exposing all investors to the risk of …re sales, the regulator may impose higher share restrictions on insiders compared to outsiders. Higher share restrictions on insiders would reverse the adverse consequences, though it would not resolve the informational advantage of investors who are tipped o¤ by managers.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the data used for this study and the measure of fund ‡ow. Section 2 introduces the main results about ‡ow-based return spreads for restricted funds, while Section 3 discusses several additional tests. Section 4 concludes. 
Data and Measures
This study obtains information about hedge funds from the Lipper/TASS dataset. The data include information about monthly hedge-fund returns, assets under management (AUM), as well as information about share restriction such as lockup and redemption notice periods. The data include both "live" and "dead" funds. Table 1 We estimate investment ‡ow by applying the conventional ‡ow calculation (see, e.g., Sirri and Tufano (1998), Fung, Hsieh, Naik, and Ramadorai (2008)). In contrast to existing literature, which deals with ‡ow at low frequencies, such as quarterly, semi-annual, and annual, this paper analyzes ‡ow using monthly intervals, which are typically the shortest available in most hedge-fund datasets.
The monthly frequency is likely more appropriate for our tests (see a discussion in a later section)
and it also enables us to potentially capture price e¤ects that are transitory at lower frequencies.
We use the following formula to estimate fund ‡ow
where AU M i;t represents the value of the assets under management of fund i at month t and R i;t is the fund's return. Overall, our sample includes 392,300 monthly ‡ow observations among which 356,229 are considered reliable (91% of ‡ow observations).
The data include a couple of variables that are used to proxy for the tightness of fund share restrictions. These variables are the redemption notice period, that is the number of days prior to withdrawing capital from a fund that an investor has to notify the hedge-fund manager, and the lockup period, that is the number of days following an investment for which investors are not allowed to withdraw their capital. Both variables are used as binary variables, valued at zero if there is no restriction (no notice period required for redemptions or no lockup period) and one otherwise. The main results of the paper are obtained using the redemption notice period, while lockups are used later for robustness.
Flow-Based Portfolios
In this section, we demonstrate the role of ‡ow in understanding future fund performance using hedge funds grouped into portfolios. We report both portfolio returns excess of the industry average and risk-adjusted returns (alphas) using the Fung and Hsieh (2001) factors. 6 The inudstry average return is computed each month as the equally weighted average return of the hedge funds in our sample.
Some studies raise concerns about a potential back-…ll, or incubation bias in the hedge-fund database. Such a bias can occur if a hedge fund begins to report its performance to the data provider, and simultaneously provides its recent historical performance. To alleviate any concerns, we follow the suggestion in Jagannathan, Malakhov, and Novikov (2010), and discard the …rst 36 observations of each hedge fund reported in the database.
Portfolio Sorts
We begin the analysis by demonstrating the existence of smart money in our sample. Hedge funds are sorted into equal-size quintile portfolios based on their ‡ow over the previous month. We use the prior one-month ‡ow instead of, for example, prior three-month ‡ow as used in the literature (e.g., Fung, Hsieh, Naik, and Ramadorai (2008)), because we wish to use the most recent information available to fund investors, however on which they cannot act in the presence of share restrictions.
We rebalance portfolios monthly and hold them for one month. The results are reported in Table   2 .
Consistent with a smart-money e¤ect, portfolio returns increase with prior ‡ow. The portfolio return spread of the high-minus-low ‡ow earns 43 basis point per month (5.2% annually) with a t-statistic of 4.75. Pre-sorting funds into those restricted and those unrestricted, the results suggest that the smart-money e¤ect is only apparent among the restricted funds. The ‡ow return spread among restricted funds is about 5.6% annually; both return and alpha are statistically signi…cant (t-statistics of 4.94 and 4.90, respectively).
The time series of quarterly returns to smart money among the restricted funds in presented in Figure 1 . For this …gure, the return during a calendar quarter is simply the sum of its monthly returns. The smart-money e¤ect is positive for 84% of the quarters. The existence of smart money in restricted funds highlights that the funds for which redemption notice periods may cause information asymmetry about future ‡ows are precisely those that such information is valuable because it predicts future fund performance.
Long-Run Performance
To further establish the signi…cance of the ‡ow e¤ect, we study the long-run performance of restricted funds with recent ‡ows. Table 3 extends performances reported in Table 2 The results show that the return spread high-minus-low past- ‡ow funds is positive throughout the …rst 12 months post portfolio formation. Performance remains statistically signi…cant over the …rst ten months, ending with 35 basis points after a year. Therefore, ‡ow appears to predict a permanent e¤ect on fund value. The performances of the funds in the top and bottom quintiles of ‡ow suggests that this permanent e¤ect is due to out ‡ows rather than in ‡ows: Out ‡ow funds lose about 50 basis points over the year post formation, while in ‡ow funds exhibit a temporary gain in value followed by a full reversal within a year.
The permanent e¤ect of ‡ow seems to contrast the dumb-money results of Frazzini and Lamont (2008) . Yet, the fact that the latter results are obtained using mutual funds, while this paper uses hedge funds, may explain the apparent contradiction. This permanent e¤ect can arise if a fund's portfolio is di¤erent pre-and post- ‡ow. For example, a disproportionate sale of assets by a fund will translate into a permanent e¤ect on fund value because the price reversal following the initial price pressure may be experienced by assets that are no longer held by the fund. Another example is leverage--if a fund is required to de-leverage as part of its response to out ‡ows, the fund will not experience a full return reversal. Therefore, the ability of hedge funds to undertake more ‡exible investment decisions than mutual funds can explain the di¤erences in their long-run ‡ow e¤ect.
Manager Investment and Corporate Governance
The moral hazard scenario outlined in this paper relies on the possibility of managerial extraction of personal gains in light of inside information about fund ‡ow. This section therefore studies whether the ‡ow e¤ects in restricted funds depend on management self-investment as well as the level of fund shareholder protection.
Personal Investment
The Lipper/TASS database contains information about managers' personal capital invested in their fund. Unfortunately, as newer reported amounts replace older ones, we do not have access to the historical time-series of this quantity, and therefore we cannot directly observe managers' ‡ow.
Nonetheless, we use the last reported personal capital amount per fund, scaled by its corresponding assets under management, to proxy for the proportion of fund capital invested by managers. There are 3,726 funds (51% of the sample) for which Personal Capital Amount is reported in the database, whereas the rest choose not to report this information at all (missing observations). Among the reporting funds, 470 (13%) report capital investment greater than zero with a median of 8.9%. These results point out that the funds for which the knowledge about ‡ows seems to be particularly important, as measured by the performance they are able to predicts, are also those in which managers have a higher percentage ownership. This situation exacerbates the agency problem.
Corporate Governance
This section investigates whether the ‡ow return spread appears more signi…cant among funds that o¤er less protection of shareholders. Inspired by the corporate-governance literature (e.g., La Porta, López-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (2002) and Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003)), we consider several fund characteristics to proxy for shareholder protection, such as had it been audited, the existence of high water marks, domiciliation, and registration with the SEC. We also aggregate these variables to devise a measure of fund governance, and show that the ‡ow return spread is more pronounced in funds with low scores of investor protection.
Measures
Audit: Out of the 5,826 share-restricted funds, 4,120 have an audit date listed in the database.
Following Bollen and Pool (2009), we assume that funds with no audit date listed are likely comprised of two groups of funds, those which have been audited but for which no information was provided to the database and those which have not been audited. The conjecture is that, taken as a group, the funds with no audit date listed have less oversight than the funds with an audit date listed (see also Liang (2003)). If a fund reports a date for a completed …nancial audit it is assigned a score of one and zero otherwise.
High water mark: Some hedge funds o¤er high-water-mark protections for their investors. This mechanism allows funds to collect their performance fees only if the net asset value (NAV) exceeds the previous maximum. Without this mechanism a fund would charge performance fees given a pro…table recent period even if it fails to surpass its maximum NAV. Of the 7,280 hedge funds in our sample, 4,213 (58%) apply high water mark. A fund is assigned a high-water-mark score of one if it o¤ers investors high-water-mark provisions and zero otherwise.
Domiciliation: Hedge funds also report their "Country of Domicile"to the database. We identify 22 o¤shore centers and indicate any fund residing in one of these centers as "o¤shore." About 52% of the sample funds (3,787) are o¤shore. 
Performance and Governance
To study the impact of governance on the ‡ow return spread, for each governance variable funds are sorted into two groups according to the value of the variable (zero or one). In each group, funds are further sorted into quintiles by prior-month ‡ow. Table 5 reports the average returns of the funds in each group (relative to the equal-weighted hedge-fund index), the ‡ow return spread (calculated as the return di¤erence between the top and bottom quintiles of past ‡ow) as well as the Fung-Hsieh alpha spread, and the return di¤erences between the two groups of each governance variable.
The results are consistent across governance variables. For each variable, the ‡ow return spread of high governance outperforms that of low governance; values vary between 47 and 68 basis points per month with t-statistics varying from 3.03 to 4.51. The spread seems to stem from the bottom quintile of ‡ow, whose underperformance varies between 24 and 42 basis points per month (t-statistics vary between 2.53 and 4.77). The di¤erences in returns between high and low governance values are also particularly signi…cant for the bottom quintiles of past ‡ow. This suggests that out ‡ows predict more negative fund performance for funds with low investor protection.
We also study the impact of the aggregate governance index on the ‡ow return spread. Since the tails of the aggregate governance score distribution are relatively small, we separate funds into three similar size groups: funds whose governance scores are zero or one, funds whose score is two, and funds whose scores are three or four. Table 6 reports the ‡ow return spread for each governance group. The spread is 0.63% per month (t-statistic of 3.35) among the low-governance funds, but insigni…cant for high-governance funds. These results are mainly due to the bottom quintile of past ‡ow: The performance of the funds in this quintile drops the lower the governance, while no pattern is observed for the top quintile of past ‡ow. These …ndings are also plotted in Figure 4 . The results further stress the value of ‡ow information to fund insiders, as funds with lower governance seem to have the most exploitable opportunities.
Additional Tests
The previous section introduces the main results of the paper. In what follows, we provide additional analysis and discussion to highlight the signi…cance of the results.
Cross-Sectional Regressions
The sections above typically apply double sorts to draw conclusions. In this subsection we describe the results of cross-sectional regressions, which allow us to control for several confounding e¤ects simultaneously. The dependent variable is the monthly return of share-restricted funds, while the independent variables are prior month capital ‡ow, personal investment, and low governance. As de…ned above, personal investment is a dummy variable, which equals one if a fund reports positive capital investment by its manager and zero otherwise. Low governance is a dummy variable which is assigned a value of one if the aggregate governance score of a fund is lower than the population median and zero otherwise. We consider the following control variables: size, leverage, management fees, and performance fees. Size is computed as the natural logarithm of fund AUM at the end of the prior month and leverage is a dummy variable which equals one if a fund can undertake leverage and zero otherwise. Statistical signi…cance is inferred using Fama and MacBeth (1973) t-statistics. Table 7 reports the results using the universe of share-restricted funds. Consistent with the existence of a ‡ow return spread shown in Table 2 , the variable ‡ow is signi…cant in all regression speci…cations. The control variables size and leverage are both negative, yet not statistically signi…cant in any speci…cation. Incentive fees appear signi…cantly positive in all speci…cations while management fees positively impact hedge-fund performance, but the e¤ect is not always signi…cant.
Personal investment yields mixed evidence. The low-corporate-governance indicator is signi…cantly negative. This result may be of independent interest to researchers, as it provides corroborating evidence for the e¤ects of corporate governance so far shown for companies. For example, Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) …nd that …rms with high corporate governance also earn higher stock returns (see also Core, Guay, and Rusticus (2006)). Our results suggest such an e¤ect is also present in the universe of hedge funds.
In addition, we study an interaction term between ‡ow, personal investment, and low governance. The results in the previous section suggests ‡ow would be more valuable for predicting fund performance for funds that hold manager personal investments and whose governance score is low.
Consistent with this prediction, the interaction term is positive and signi…cant.
Investment Style
Each hedge fund in the database is classi…ed into one of the following investment-style groups: 
Liquidity
To the extent that the act of redeeming capital may cause price pressures on the underlying assets under management (e.g., Coval and Sta¤ord (2007) and Lou (2009)), we investigate whether the ‡ow return spread is more pronounced in funds that invest in illiquid assets. We use the measure proposed by Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004), which is estimated each month using a 60-month rolling window of fund returns. 
Operational Risk
The fund governance measure we develop in this paper is closely related to hedge fund operational risk. Relying on US SEC …ling information on hedge funds (form ADV), Brown, Goetzmann, Liang, and Schwarz (2009) de…ne operational risk based on personnel problems, investment process, internal control, portfolio pricing, and compliance issues. They document a positive relation between a fund's internal and external con ‡ict-of-interests as well as ownership structure characteristics and legal and regulatory problems. While operational risk covers a broad range of issues, in this paper we mainly focus on one operational aspect, fund governance. Nonetheless, we expect a broad operational risk measure to partially substitute for the fund governance measure, and therefore o¤er a robustness analysis using this measure.
We estimate the time series of operational risk for each fund in our sample following the Omega approximation suggested in Brown, Goetzmann, Liang, and Schwarz (2009). That paper includes approximations for the relation between operational risk and other fund characteristics. We therefore use observable fund characteristics to obtain estimates of operational risk each month. Note that two of the four variables that we consider for our measure of governance ("Audit" and "Domiciliation"), are also used to estimate Omega. Also, we set the coe¢ cient of the variable "Personal Investment" to zero because, although it may reduce operational risk, it exacerbates the potential front-running by fund managers.
We replace the Low Governance dummy variable with Omega and repeat the analysis reported in Table 7 . Unreported results (available from the authors by request) indicate that, similar to Low Governance, a high Omega predicts low fund returns (t-statistic of 2.25) and the coe¢ cient of the interaction between Flow, Personal Investment, and Omega is positive (t-statistic of 1.83).
Therefore, it seems that our main …ndings are robust to using the Omega measure of operational risk.
Economic Signi…cance
The analysis so far stressed the potential pro…tability of inside information about ‡ows by observing the post- ‡ow performances of hedge funds. One can also express the potential value of information about ‡ows in terms of dollar amounts using a simple, back-of-the-envelope calculation as follows.
The number of funds with a positive personal investment in the database is 440, whereas the number of funds with a value of zero personal investment is 1,242. The rest of the funds have missing values. Therefore, the fraction of positive-value funds is 26% (=440/ (440+1,242) ). Conditional on a positive personal investment, the median of this amount if 9.51% of a fund's AUM. Thus, the unconditional fraction of total hedge-fund AUM is 2.5% (=26% 9.51%). Our exercise uses the total AUM of share-restricted funds each month and calculates the potential pro…ts earned by avoiding the ‡ow return spread in the following month. We then multiply this sum by 2.5% are repeat this procedure across all the months in the sample period. Our calculation yields an amount of $214.48 million on average per year or $2.4 billion over the entire sample period.
The quantity calculated above assumes that the managers fully redeem their shares when they are faced with signi…cant redemption requests from investors. Yet, it does not include the possibility of preferential treatment for some select clients that are given information about ‡ow from the fund manager prior before other clients (as outlined in the case against State Street Bank and Trust described in the introduction). Therefore, we argue that our estimation be viewed as conservative.
Conclusion
This paper provides an assessment of the potential pro…ts associated with trading based on inside information about hedge-fund-investor ‡ows. Focusing on share-restricted funds, we …nd that funds with recent out ‡ow underperform funds with recent in ‡ow, especially for the group of funds with high personal investment of fund insiders and low corporate governance. The ‡ow-based return spread amounts to 5.6% per year over 1998-2008, after controlling for various risk factors.
Therefore, despite the lack of direct supporting evidence for the above-mentioned SEC case …lings, the ‡ow-based return spreads documented in this paper may provide a quanti…cation of the potential pro…ts from engaging in the alleged ‡ow-front-running activity in the hedge-fund industry.
The results of this study have several implications. Hedge-fund managers typically impose share restrictions on their investors to limit the potential impact of large out ‡ows on their funds'asset prices. However, such constraints may also allow fund managers to take advantage of information concerning their investor future ‡ow. Therefore, similar to the prevention of insider trading in publicly traded corporate securities, fund managers should be required to disclose their intention to subscribe to or redeem shares from the funds they manage to avoid the appearance of frontrunning their less- ‡ow-informed investors. A potential resolution might involve the imposition of tighter share restrictions on fund managers and insiders in comparison to outside investors. The tables reports the performances of share-restriced hedge funds sorted into groups by investment style and past flow. A fund is share-restricted if it imposes a nonzero redemption-notice period. Every month, the funds of each investment style are sorted into three portfolios based on prior-month flow (F1 is the lowest flow tercile and F3 is the highest). Portfolios are equally weighted and rebalanced monthly. The table reports the average portfolio returns excess of the industry average, as well as the average returns of the top-minus-bottom flow portfolios and their risk-adjusted returns (alphas) using the Fung-Hsieh factors. The group ARB includes the arbitrage strategy funds, i.e., Convertibel Arbitrage, Even Driven, and Fixed Income Arbitrage. Square brackets include t -statistics. The sample includes the universe of hedge funds on Lipper/TASS for the period 1998-2008.
F3 -F1 auditing, high water mark, country of domicile, and SEC registration. If a fund reports a completed financial audit it is assigned a score of one and zero otherwise. If a fund applies a high water mark it is assigned a score of one and zero otherwise. If a fund is domiciled onshore it is assigned a score of one and zero if it is domiciled offshore. If a fund is registered with the SEC it is assigned a score of one and zero otherwise. Panel A displays the distribution of each governance variable, where low and high governance represent values of zero and one, respectively. Panel B plots the distribution of the aggregate governance score, which is calculated as the sum of the four individual governance variables. The sample includes the universe of hedge funds on Lipper/TASS for the period 1998-2008. . Each month share-restricted hedge funds are sorted by aggregate governance and past-flow. Aggregate governance is calculated as the sum of four individual governance variables: financial auditing, high water mark, country of domicile, and SEC registration. If a fund reports a completed financial audit it is assigned a score of one and zero otherwise. If a fund applies a high water mark it is assigned a score of one and zero otherwise. If a fund is domiciled onshore it is assigned a score of one and zero if it is domiciled offshore. If a fund is registered with the SEC it is assigned a score of one and zero otherwise. Low governance includes funds with an aggregate governance score of either 0 or 1, Medium includes funds with an aggregate governance score of 2, and High includes funds with an aggregate score of either 3 or 4. The funds in each aggregate governance group are sorted each month into five equally weighted portfolios based on prior-month flow. Portfolios are rebalanced monthly. The figure plots the average portfolio returns excess of the industry average for the top and bottom quintiles of flow. The sample includes the universe of hedge funds on Lipper/TASS for the period 1998-2008. 
